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Abstract 
The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) being negotiated by the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) Countries are already causing great concern, because they threaten to undermine economic development 
in some of the World’s poorest and most vulnerable countries. That is, the EPAs, the European Union’s much 
vaunted trade and development agreements with ACP countries, are in complete disarry.Despite the passing of a 
key negotiating deadlines at the end of 2007 and 2009, and relentless pressure from European Commission (EC) 
negotiators, many countries in Africa have refused to sign any form of EPA (even though some have lost their 
tariff preferences as a result). The overall consequences for their economies are simply too threatening. That is 
African countries have little to gain from EPAs and are participating simply to try and retain their existing trade 
preferences with the EU. But it seems they have a great deal to lose if they sign up to and implement EPAs. 
There is a significant chance that EPAs will increase poverty and hunger, rather the reduce them, and have 
negative impacts on environment. This paper therefore suggests that the European Union must find alternative 
routes to assist ACP countries to develop fair and sustainable societies” 
Keywords: Partnership, poverty, sustainable development, economic agreement, trade barriers, tariffs, 
cooperation, treaty, preferences. 
 
Introduction 
On 7th-8th January 2008, protests took place in African countries against the planned Economic Partnership 
Agreement with the European Union (EU). In Dakar (Senegal) 50,000 people took part in a demonstration. 
Several thousand people went onto the streets in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), and in Mauritania and Bamako 
(Mali) large Social Forum meetings have been organized. In total, people in 20 countries protested against the 
agreement which will be a further neo-liberal attack. 
The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) being negotiated by the EU and African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) Countries are already causing great concern, because they threaten to undermine economic 
development in some of the World’s poorest and most vulnerable countries. That is, the EPAs, the European 
Union’s much vaunted trade and development agreements with ACP countries, are in complete disarry.Despite 
the passing of a key negotiating deadline at the end of 2007, and relentless pressure from European Commission 
(EC) negotiators, many countries in Africa, including Nigeria, Congo and Gabon, have refused to sign any form 
of EPA (even though some have lost their tariff preferences as a result). The overall consequences for their 
economies are simply too threatening (Hall, 2008:1). 
Essentially, EPAs replace previous non-reciprocal, development-oriented agreements between the EU 
and the ACP, with a fragmented, supposedly in order to comply with WTO rules. However, this new trade focus 
is conveniently in keeping with the EU’s aggressive trade liberalization objectives, as laid out in the European 
Commission’s communication ‘Global Europe: competing in the World’ (EC,2006), which seeks to secure 
access to natural resources and open markets to European goods and services. (CCWG, 2004:28). 
Indeed, the EU and the ACP countries first established a development cooperation agreement in 1975, 
when the first Lome convention was agreed between the EU and former colonies of some of the EU’s member 
states. Lome provided a framework for development aid and investment flows from the EU to the ACP countries 
and granted non-reciprocal preferential access for ACP exports to the EU (ACP, 2008). 
The Lome conventions constituted a single model in the North-South relationship, combining a trade 
preference regime with important of aids. The objectives were to improve the trade performance of the ACP 
group of countries, the European Community offered non-reciprocal trade preferences to products originating in 
ACP countries (Kone, 2008: 6). 
The EPAs, which will be the new cooperative framework under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement 
(CPA), are expected to adopt an integrated approach based on partnership and promoting cooperation, trade and 
political dialogue between the EU and ACP countries. One essential characteristics of this multilateral 
partnership is that it hopes to combine responses to the challenge of globalization and the development aid 
essential to ACP countries; with a strengthened political dimension. The key CPA principles are reciprocity, 
differentiation, deeper regional integration, and coordination of trade and aid (Karingi, 2006:2). 
Indeed, according to many observers, the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations, which 
African countries are negotiating with the European nations, are unlikely to bring Africa closer to their 
development objectives. The way EPA has been conceived, based on the requirement for reciprocal market 
opening with the European Union (EU), is likely to bring more losses than gains for Africa. It will make the path 
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to development even more difficult and uphill than it already is. (Aileen Kwa, 2009: 1). 
The way EPA has been conceived, based on the requirement for reciprocal market opening with the 
European Union (EU), is likely to bring more losses than gains for Africa. The gains are not much, as the Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs), which make up 34 out of 47 African countries negotiating the EPAs, can avail of 
the Everything But Arms (EBA) preferential scheme of the EU. And the value of the preferences African 
countries will reap from an EPA will essentially become nil in about 5 to 10 years. It is of vital importance for 
developing and the least developed countries, that the options for industrialization for future generations are not 
foreclosed. 
Whilst the price to pay for African countries wanting to maintain preferential access into the EU is 
very high, the value of EU’s preferences is going to diminish rapidly. The value of the preferences African 
countries will reap from an EPA will essentially become nil in about 5 to 10 years. This is because the EU is 
already negotiating Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with Central America, Andean countries, ASEAN, India and 
others. Therefore, for preferences that will last 5 or at most 10 years, African countries are being asked to sign 
away their trade policy space. (Aileen, 2009: 1). 
In any case, the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), which make up 34 out of 47 African countries 
negotiating the EPAs, can avail of the Everything But Arms (EBA) preferential scheme of the EU. For non-LDCs, 
options more supportive of development should be fully explored, including the search for regional and other 
markets (rather than looking mainly to the EU for export markets), the Generalized System of Preferences plus 
(GSP+), as well as renegotiating Article 24 of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
It is based on the above facts that this paper seeks to examine and analyze the provisions of the EPA 
and their social economic impacts on African society. Therefore, the paper is divided into six parts. Following 
the introduction is the history of ACP-EU economic and trade relations. This is followed by an overview of the 
EU-Africa EPAs negotiations. The next part is the examination of the EPAs provisions. The social and economic 
impacts of the EPAs on Africa come under fifth part, while the last part is the recommendations and conclusion. 
 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Contact between Europe and the ACP countries dates back to the era of discovery of new territories primarily 
propelled by the need to seek raw materials to feed the bourgeoning industrial revolution in Europe. This contact 
led to trade between the local inhabitants who had their agricultural produce and other raw materials to trade on 
and the Europeans who had some finished goods to trade on. This relationship later metamorphosed into the 
slave trade and subsequently into colonization. Meanwhile, sometime in 1957, some countries in Europe came 
together under the Treaty of Rome and formed the European Economic Community (EEC). Thus marking the 
genesis of regional integration in Europe and what we know today as the European Union. 
Yaoundé Convention 
At the attainment of independence by most of the colonies especially in the sixties, there was a paradigm shift in 
the relationship between the two groups as the emphasis became more on cooperation on social and economic 
fronts especially in the process of building the newly independent states. In the ECOWAS sub-region, the first 
concrete attempt at creating a framework for economic cooperation was between the EEC and mainly French-
speaking West African states and Madagascar, and this led to the Yaoundé Convention of 1963 which was based 
on trade and financial aid. 
Lome Conventions 
The Lome Conventions marked the beginning of an inclusive approach to EU-ACP cooperation after the demise 
of the Yaoundé Agreement which lasted for five years. The concrete cooperation between EU and the ACP 
Countries dates back to 1975 which transcended from successive agreements called the “Lomé Conventions.” 
The first Lome Convention lasted from 1975 to 1980 under the 4th European Development Fund (EDF). The 
second Lome convention or Lome II thrived from 1980 to 1985 under the 5th EDF, while Lome III lasted from 
1985 to 1990 and was overseen by the 6th EDF.   
There were two Lome IV conventions. The first one lived from 1990 to 1995 under the 7th EDF with 
some amendments bringing about the second Lome that thrived from 1995 to the 2000, ushering in the powerful 
Cotonou Agreement that sought development as a pivot for the relationship under the 9th EDF. It is the Cotonou 
Agreement that eventually became the mother of EPA.  
Thus, for the first time, ACP countries were expected to participate in reciprocal trade agreements with 
the EU, in return for development assistance. This means they are now expected to give trade concessions, in 
order to get – or even retain – their trade preferences. The extraordinary negotiations which ensued saw the 
previous EU-ACP relationship turned on its head, as the EU sought to use EPAs to drive home an aggressive 
trade liberalization strategy, which is now expressed through its ‘Global Europe’ strategy. 
The Cotonou Agreement 
Whereas the successive Lomé Conventions were essentially non-reciprocal agreements which embedded socio-
economic cooperative mechanisms and measures and particularly trade agreements that grant unilateral trade 
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preferences, the Cotonou Agreement brought about the question of Reciprocity in the trade arrangement between 
the two parties, and the element is what is called the EPA which is currently being negotiated. EPA is meant to 
be WTO compatible arrangement. 
 
The EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA): What is it? 
Economic Partnership Agreements are a scheme to create a free trade area (FTA) between the European 
Commission of the European Union and the Group of African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. They are 
a response to continuing criticism that the non-reciprocal and discriminating preferential trade agreements 
offered by the EU are incompatible with WTO rules. The EPAs are a key element of the Cotonou Agreement, 
the latest agreement in the history of ACP-EU Development Cooperation and are to take effect as of 2008. EPAs 
are based on four pillars (EU: 2007:1-12); 
Partnership: EPAs are partnership agreements, entailing rights and obligations for both sides. Compliance with 
the obligations by each side is essential for the achievement of the entire undertaking. In particular, while the 
Union will be prepared to further open up its market to ACP products and tackle all other trade barriers, the ACP 
States must be prepared to implement appropriate policies to strengthen their supply capacity and to reduce 
transaction costs.   
Regional integration: Regional integration is a powerful means of fostering integration into the world economy. 
The EU itself has built its strength on regional integration. The recent progress made in regional integration 
within the ACP reflects the political decision of the ACP States to base their own integration into the world 
economy on regional economic integration. EPAs will therefore be based on regional integration initiatives 
existing in the ACP.   
Development: EPAs are above all instruments for development. They will therefore be designed taking into 
account the economic, social and environmental constraints of the ACP countries concerned and of their capacity 
to adapt to the new trading environment.  
Link to WTO: Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are not an end in themselves but are intended to act as 
a stepping stone to the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy. They will therefore 
build upon the rules of the WTO, taking into account the results of the Doha Development Agenda.  
Reciprocity: Due to the continuing WTO incompatibility of previous arrangements, the EPAs' key feature is 
their reciprocity and their non-discriminatory nature. They involve the phased out removal of all trade 
preferences which have been established between the EU and the ACP countries since 1975 as well as the 
progressive removal of trade barriers between the partners. In order to fulfill the criterion of being a non-
discriminatory agreement, the EPAs are open to all developing countries, thereby effectively terminating the 
ACP group as the main development partner of the EU (EU, 2007:13). 
The establishment of a reciprocal trade agreement confronts the EU with the problem of how to 
reconcile the special status of the ACP group with the EU’s obligations to the WTO. The solution proposed for 
this dilemma is an agreement which is only as reciprocal as necessary to fulfill WTO criteria. In reality, the ACP 
countries will have some room to manoeuvre and to maintain some limited protection of their most vital products. 
The extent to which trade must be liberalized under the new EPAs is still a widely debated issue and it remains 
to be seen whether the WTO provisions regulating regional trade agreements will be revised in favour of the 
EPA scheme at the end of the Doha Round (ibid.). 
 Regionalism 
True to the Cotonou principle of differentiation and regionalization the developing countries are encouraged to 
enter into the EPAs in regional groupings. So far the ACP countries have formed six regional groupings in 
which they intend to enter into EPAs with the European Union. These regional groupings are 
• l'Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine  
• la Communauté économique et monétaire de l'Afrique centrale  
• the Southern African Development Community  
• the East African Community  
• the Caribbean Community + Dominican Republic (CARIFORUM)  
• the Pacific region. 
• Economic Community of West African States 
 Special treatment 
The new regional grouping established due to the EPA scheme causes the problem of how to reconcile this 
approach with the previous special treatment of the group of least developed countries (LDCs) among the ACP 
countries. Currently, 39 of the 77 ACP countries are defined as LDCs by the United Nations. The LDCs 
constitute a special group among the developing countries and have usually been treated separately. 
Therefore, EPA also will provide special arrangements for this particular group. As opposed to the 
other ACP countries, the group of LDCs will be invited to reject the EPAs and continue trade relations under the 
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"Everything But Arms" (EBA) regulation. Launched in 2001 by the Council of Ministers, this amendment to the 
Generalized System of Preferences has ever since regulated the trade relations between the EU and the LDCs, 
granting duty-free access to all products from LDCs without any quantitative restrictions – except to arms and 
munitions. While this provision facilitates the situation of the LDCs under the new trade scheme, it has also been 
criticized that the EBA initiative prevents LDCs to open up their markets for EU products within the context of 
an EPA (Curran, et al, 2007). 
Overview of EPA Negotiations with Africa 
The Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations started in 2002, as a part of the Cotonou negotiations, 
according to the rules of the WTO (World Trade Organization). Seventy seven countries in Africa, the Caribbean 
and Pacific are affected. The EU already threatened those countries that did not sign with severe sanctions. The 
EPA is supposed to replace the so-called preferential trade, which ensured small export advantages to countries 
(mostly former colonies of the European powers). 
The origin of the EU-Africa joint strategy can be traced to an EU strategy for working with Africa. 
This is set out in a document entitled ‘The EU & Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership,’ which was adopted 
at a European Council meeting on 15 and 16 December 2005. The primary aims of this strategy are the 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and the promotion of sustainable development, security and 
good governance in Africa.  
Under the heading ‘Sustainable Economic Growth, Regional Integration and Trade’ the EU recognizes 
that rapid, sustained and broad-based growth is essential for ending poverty in Africa. Accordingly, the EU 
commits itself to the following (Wilson, 2007:3-5):  
• Facilitate a better-connected Africa, to itself and the rest of the world; including by establishing an 
EU/Africa Infrastructure Partnership, which will be complementary to the new Infrastructure 
Consortium for Africa and include existing initiatives on transport and to facilitate peoples’ access to 
water and sanitation, energy and information technology.  
• Promote a stable, efficient and harmonized legal business framework in Africa, for example by 
convening a Euro-African Business Forum in 2006.  
• Help to integrate Africa fully into the world trade system, by pressing for a successful outcome to the 
Doha Round of world trade talks that is ambitious, maximizes development gains, ensures special and 
differential treatment, addresses preference erosion and makes trade work for the poor, and extends 
duty and quota-free market access for LDCs to all industrialized country markets.  
• Provide increased aid for trade, building on the EC’s commitment of €1 billion per year by 2010.  
• Agree EPAs with Africa’s regional groupings by 2008 that are instruments of development, promote 
regional integration, improve African access to European and regional markets; support asymmetric and 
flexible implementation of EPAs; and reduce non-tariff barriers. In addition, the EU will closely 
monitor EPAs so that they help achieve development objectives; and also redouble efforts to complete 
by 2010 agreement on an EU-Mediterranean Free Trade Area.  
• Help African countries comply with EU rules and standards, establish clear rules for services, simplify 
rules of origin and make them more development friendly.  
• Support Africa in countering the effects of climate change in accordance with the EU Action Plan on 
Climate Change and Development; and protect its environment through a range of policies, by 
combating desertification and ensuring the sustainable management of its forests, land and biodiversity 
fisheries and water. Such support includes, for example, €500million for the EU Water Facility and 
€220 million for the Energy Facility under EDF 9.  
At the 5th Ministerial Meeting of the African and EU Troikas held in Bamako on 2 December 2005 
(i.e. before the EU strategy was adopted by the European Council), the African side welcomed the then draft EU 
strategy. However, at the suggestion of the African representatives it was agreed to transform the EU strategy 
into a joint EU-Africa Strategy.  
At the 6th Ministerial Troika Meeting held on 8 May 2006 in Vienna, it was further agreed that the 
joint strategy be a focused, political document, setting out a vision of EU-African relations in the decade ahead, 
and building on a dialogue that should be flexible, deeper, more frequent and include new areas of common 
interest. It was also agreed that the joint strategy be structured around the four clusters of peace and security, 
human rights and governance, trade and integration, and development. 
 A roadmap for further work on the joint strategy was agreed at the 7th Ministerial Troika Meeting 
held on 10 October 2006 in Brazzaville. This included preparing an outline for the joint strategy and consulting 
with civil society and other stakeholders. An expert group was mandated to implement this roadmap and present 
the results at the 8th Ministerial Troika Meeting. The intention is that further work be undertaken during 2007 so 
that the joint strategy can be adopted at the Second Europe-Africa Summit in Lisbon in late 2007 (Wilson, 
2007:5-15) 
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However, the Negotiating Mandate for the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between West 
Africa and the European Union was given to the ECOWAS Commission in collaboration with the UEMOA 
Commission. In view of this mandate and on the basis of the EPA negotiations launched in the ACP regions, the 
West African region and the European Union adopted the following three-point roadmap in August 2004 
(Daramy, 2008:1-7): 
 (i) Deepening of the regional integration process;  
 (ii) Enhancement of competitiveness: capacity building and upgrading;  
 (iii) Activities linked to the preparation and conduct of the negotiations.  
The two sides asserted in the roadmap, that the main objective of the Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) is to promote the strengthening of regional integration and sustainable economic development 
in the West African region.  
The indicative schedule for the negotiations presents the following three phases:  
 • Phase 1: December 2004 to September 2005: integration priorities, setting of EPA reference 
framework and upgrading programmes;  
 • Phase 2: September 2005 to September 2006: the overall structure of the EPA and the draft 
Agreement in trade-related areas;  
 • Phase 3: September 2006 to December 2007: Negotiation of liberalization and conclusion of the EPA 
(ibid). 
  
SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS ON AFRICA 
The effects of the EPA on African countries will be disastrous; it will expose local production further to big 
international corporations, boosting the market and profits for the imperialist powers. The banning of restrictions 
on exports will include lifting quotas on the amounts of raw materials which have to stay in the country. The 
majority of the population in the countries concerned work in agriculture (e.g. Burkina Faso 80%, Mali 70%) 
and will be hit twice by the Economic Partnership Agreement. According to the agreement, it is not allowed to 
raise taxes on imports or to subsidize the domestic agricultural sector. The result is that the African markets will 
be further inundated by cheap vegetables, eggs, and meat from Europe (Kone, 2008: 2). 
Already, in recent years, cheap European products replaced many of the local products. In Mali, a 
country where there is a cow at every street corner, it is, today, nearly impossible to buy milk. Instead, people 
have to buy cheaper milk powder from Nestlé. Coffee from the neighboring Ivory Coast is, at best, available in 
tourist cafés. In Ghana, the import of tomato paste increased from 26,000 tons to 40,000 tons, from 2002 to 2004 
(Aremu, 2008:8-12). 
A consequence of this is that food safety will become further dependent on the big European 
corporations and it will also destroy the basis of existence of many peasants. That is why Aminata Traoré, 
spokesperson of the Forum for another Mali, explained at a press conference in Bamako: “There is a close 
connection between the EPA and immigration. In destroying the workplaces of many young people, it creates 
new reasons to migrate.”(Kone, 2008:5). 
At the same time, through the abolition of import taxes, the Economic Partnership Agreement-hit 
countries will loose one of their main tax revenues. Under pressure, the EU has now promised to compensate for 
the losses. But nobody believes this will be done for the long term and many people see this will be nothing else 
but a direct gift to the big European enterprises, which do not have to pay import duties, any more. 
In addition, the service sector and the rest of the public services will be completely opened up to 
European corporations. It is true, during the last years, under pressure from the neo-liberal Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs), everything which promises any kind of profit has already been privatized. In Bamako, 
since the privatization of refuse collection, waste often remains discarded in streets and is collected by locals 
using donkeys and carts. 
Behind the Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations is the growing competition over the African 
market. In recent years, China, especially, gained influence through increased trade with Africa. During a visit to 
Africa by the Chinese foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, in January, China announced that its trade with Africa grew, 
in 2007, by about 30% to 50 billion euro. China agreed on a most ‘favoured nation’ clause with 41 countries, and 
it is negotiating a free trade agreement with South Africa. These are key reasons for the EU to try to ensure its 
influence. 
But the European countries also compete against each other. The German Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation (BMZ) declared: “The engagement of the German economy should be much stronger, taken into 
account the manifold market opportunities in Africa” (GMEC, 2007). 
The planned EPA goes so far that even neo-liberal politicians, like the Senegalese president, Wade, 
protested against it. Wade published an open letter against the agreement, which the South African president 
signed, as well. In addition to the protest of unions and peasant organizations, many well-known managers 
signed a petition against the EPA. The Senegalese government distributed free T-shirts against the EPA and 
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many government members took part in the 7 January anti-EPA demonstration. 
But while the government and the managers are outraged because only the profit interests of European 
enterprises are taken into account and not those of local Senegalese companies, and because they fear for state 
finances, it is the workers and peasants who suffer from neo-liberal policies, from the Senegalese government 
and the EU. This is the reason why a general strike was called in Senegal for 9 January, against the rise in the 
cost of living. The unions postponed the strike because of the anti-EPA demonstration and offered time for new 
negotiations with the government until March. But it is a mistake to think that the government could be a reliable 
partner in the fight against this agreement. Instead, a general strike should have been used to build up pressure on 
both the Senegal government and the EU (Schnatter, 2008:2-4). 
A clear example of the Senegalese government’s neo-liberal policies is seen in the higher education 
sector: the students in Senegal were on strike for several months, last year, against the lack of space in university 
buildings and against a university reform, which among other things, threatens students with the introduction of 
tuition fees. 
Many opponents of the Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations are full of hopes in the creation 
of a functioning African market as a “counter-weight” to the EU, US and China, which they hope would lead to 
rising living standards. 
It is absurd that African fruits are exported to the EU if there is a local market. Of course, all attempts 
to further exploit the African continent in the interest of European capitalist profits have to be resisted. Therefore, 
the importance of the current protest is not to be underestimated. 
But, within the capitalist system, it is an illusion to think that an African market, insulated from 
international competition, could be created. The big economic powers, the EU, US and China, will never accept 
that a region they exploit becomes a strong competitor. They made this clear with their recent threats to those 
who will not sign the EPA. In the past, they big powers proved they do not hesitate to provoke conflicts and wars 
when it is in their interests (Oxfam, 2006). 
However, a harmonious African market is not the motivation of the current African rulers, either. 
South Africa, for example, established itself as a regional imperialist power. In countries like Namibia it is hard 
to find products without the label “made in RSA”. The South African capitalists do not want to lose this market 
to European, or any other competitors. 
This is why a part of the mass movement against the agreement is drawing the conclusion that they 
have to find other partners in the fight against neo-liberalism. At a conference in Bamako, several speakers from 
peasants’ organizations and unions pointed out that in Europe workers also protested against neo-liberal attacks, 
and cited the protests against attacks on pensions in several countries. 
Aminata Traoré, from the Forum for Another Mali, compared the EPA with the undemocratic attempt 
to impose an EU constitution. “We need a coalition with other forces in the north, who know that this economic 
system is a blind alley.” The coalition we need is an international one, of the working people and poor, that 
struggles against capitalism and for a socialist alternative that can truly liberate humanity from poverty and crisis 
(Kone, 2008: 3-6). 
According to Ronnie Hall (2008:8), EPAs, should they be completed and implemented, look set to 
force Africa countries to open up their struggling markets to European industrial (and some agricultural) exports; 
to foreign investment, targeted especially at the agricultural, forestry and mining sectors, all of which are likely 
aggravate deforestation and food security concerns. The ACP countries, especially the 32 located in Africa, stand 
to gain little in return, especially since least Developed Countries (LDCs) already qualify for the EU’s Duty-Free 
Quota access to European markets.  
Thus, if negotiations on Economic Partnership Agreements continue, they could lead to trade deals that 
have significant negative impacts on forests, biodiversity and forest-dependent communities in Africa. The EU’s 
own mid-term Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) clearly acknowledged the likelihood of such impacts 
(PWC, 2007). 
For example, the mid-term version of the EPA SIA predicted that EPAs could infact ”accelerate the 
collapse” of the manufacturing sector in West Africa (PWC, 2003: 125). This goes entirely against the gain of 
the Millennium Development Goals agreed in 2000, which list the eradication of poverty and hunger and the 
maintenance of environmental sustainability as two of the world’s most pressing priorities. 
Also, the EC is disingenuous when it equates trade liberalization with development. If this were really 
the case it would not be necessary to force unwelcome issues, such as the Singapore issues (which include 
liberalization of investment, competition and government procurement) onto the negotiation table – especially 
when they have been already roundly rejected by developing countries in the WTO. 
In terms of the liberalization coverage, most African countries are heavily dependent on import taxes 
to raise government revenue. The World Bank estimates that in sub-Saharan Africa tariff revenues average 
between 7-10 percent of government revenue. With EU products representing 40 percent of total imports in sub-
Saharan Africa, eliminating tariff on EU’ import would lower tariff revenues considerably (Busse et al, 2004” 
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These losses are likely to have serious impacts on government spending because Africa countries, if 
they are unable to mitigate the loss by raising revenue in other ways, will be forced to cut fiscal expenditure. 
This could in turn put social welfare programmes at risk and lead to declining investment in health and education. 
To put it into perspective, the estimated tariff revenue loss as a result of EPAs for Republic of Congo is roughly 
equivalent to the government’s total public expenditure on education (Karingi, 2005: 5). 
Not only do EPAs threaten productive sectors, they could severely undermine the ability of ACP 
governments (especially Africa) to support future economic development. Virtually, all countries that have 
developed in the past have used tariff policy to encourage small enterprises to move up the value chain into new 
manufacturing and processing industries. This entails changing tariff levels in response to the needs of the 
economy and to national or regional development priorities. The EPAs will severely restrict the ability of ACP 
governments to use tariff policy in this way. Freezing tariffs under EPAs therefore runs the risks of locking ACP 
countries into production of primary commodities and preventing economic development (Akyuz, 2005:12). 
EPAs’ potential impacts on forest and biodiversity could also have direct social and economic 
repercussions on the poorest people in participating ACP countries, by removing the natural resources they rely 
on, especially in times of hardship. As the UN Millennium Ecosystem Assessment points out “the degradation of 
ecosystem services is harming many of the world’s poorest people and is sometimes the principal factor causing 
poverty” and “the world’s poor depend disproportionately on ecosystem to provide for their systems of small-
scale agriculture. (Grazing, harvesting, hunting and fishing). Without access to infrastructure providing safe 
drinking water, electricity, fuel and transportation, poor people rely on natural sources of clean air and water, 
fertile soil, renewable energy and biodiversity to meet their needs” (Sachs & Melinick, 2005). 
Similarly, a report from the World Resources Institute, the World Bank, the United Nations 
Environment Programme and the United Nations Development Programme also argues that natural resources 
represent a route out of poverty for the impoverished: “three-fourths of them live in rural areas; their 
environment is all they can depend on. Environment resources are absolutely essential, rather than incidental, if 
we are to have any hope of meeting our goals of poverty reduction” (UNDP et al, 2005). 
In addition, why should ACP countries be required to open some 80% plus of their tariff lines to 
European imports, when no such requirements is made of them in the WTO, precisely because their economies 
are vulnerable and developing? There are many who believe that such drastic liberalization will undermine 
domestic production and economic development, and threaten food security – precisely the opposite of what is 
desired (Nduwugwe 2008:27). 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS / WAY FORWARD 
For countries that want to sign an EPA, we propose the use of development benchmarks pegged to their trade 
liberalization schedules. This will ensure that only when countries attain a certain level of development will they 
have to undertake very far reaching reform of their trade regimes vis-à-vis a very strong economic partner, the 
EU.  
The liberalization schedules we propose kicks in 10 years after the entry into force of an EPA. If at that 
time, countries have attained 20 percent the economic size (measured by per capita Gross National Income and 
per capita value of manufactured exports) of the EU, and if their exports show a certain level of diversification, 
they would eliminate tariffs on 20 percent of their tariff lines. If after 15 years, the EPA has facilitated their 
development, and they attain 50 percent the economic size of the EU (in per capita terms), and also if the 
countries fulfill other criteria illustrating that their economies are diversified, and additionally they have a certain 
level of trade integration with other African countries, then the countries will eliminate tariffs on 50 percent of 
their tariff lines in trade with the EU. After 20 years, if they have attained 70 percent the size of the EU, and 
fulfilled the diversification and regional integration criteria, they would eliminate tariffs on 70 percent of their 
tariff lines over 5 years (CPE, 2006:6). 
We propose that this conditioned liberalization schedule be accompanied by a ‘bare bones’ goods-only 
EPA. Whilst the EU is pushing hard for countries to liberalize services, intellectual property, investment, 
competition, and government procurement, these issues are more suited when African economies have grown 
and can negotiate from a stronger position, rather than from weakness, as now. These issues are beyond the 
requirements of WTO compatibility for regional trade agreements (Article 24).  
Also, Africa countries should seriously consider the complete exclusion of competition policy from 
EPAs negotiations. Should EU pressure prove too strong to rest, Africa countries can safeguard their interests 
and maintain maximum flexibility by pushing for “best endeavour” instead of mandatory language, or by 
avoiding specific language that reflects or echoes the EU’s competition policy. Africa countries should ensure 
that any provisions are qualified at every possible instance with references to appropriateness, development 
context, flexibility and progressivity in implementation, and the possibility of providing supportive measures to 
domestic Africa market actors to boost their competitiveness. 
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In addition to the benchmarking mentioned above, the ‘bare bones’ EPA should have the following 
elements:  
• Removal of the most favoured nation treatment (MFN) clause.  
This clause makes it mandatory that African countries offer to the EU what they offer to another major 
economy after the entry into force of the EPA. This works against regional integration and the 
promotion of south-south trade. It also goes beyond the requirements of the WTO’s Article 24 on 
regional trade agreements and free trade agreement. 
• Removal of the standstill clause. All the interim EPA agreements have a standstill clause, disallowing 
new customs duties to be applied, or existing ones to be raised, even for sensitive products, after entry 
into force of the Agreement. This again goes beyond Article 24 and could prevent African countries 
from industrializing and increasing their domestic agricultural production. 
• Removal of the provision to freeze export taxes and duties. This clause is again beyond the scope of 
Article 24. The EU wants access to Africa’s raw materials in order to maintain its competitiveness. Yet 
putting in place these export taxes and duties is important to encourage diversification and value 
addition for African economies. The WTO allows countries to impose these export taxes and duties.  
• The bilateral safeguard in the EPAs should:  
- kick in automatically without having to go through a decision with the EU  
- allow countries to raise their tariffs beyond the Uruguay Round bound rate, which is what the EU 
currently enjoys in the WTO’s Special Safeguard Provision (the SSG – in Article 5 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture) . 
- allow for a safeguard in the context of a price decline, not only a volume surge (also the case in the 
WTO’s SSG which the EU avails of, but which is not available to the majority of African countries) . 
• Introduce a more ‘proactive’ infant industry clause. The current infant industry clause is ‘reactive’ - 
only limited to a safeguard when injury has happened or is threatening to take place. A more proactive 
infant industry clause will allow a government or the sub-region to put in place additional duties on 
such goods imported into its area which compete with its own infant industries. An infant industry can 
be defined as an industry which has been established for not more than 15 years. This clause should not 
expire since countries will always have infant industries.  
 In their submissions, the member organizations of Via Campesina in Africa, Europe and the 
Caribbean opined that the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the European Union (EU) and the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) are a new threat for the peasants and small farmers in the four 
regions. We ask a definitive stop in the negotiations and the opening of a period of debate and analyses on the 
impacts of free-trade on our national agricultures. Alternatives based on the right to food sovereignty exist. 
The Economic Partnership Agreements EU-ACP is free trade agreements. They are not, as the 
European Commission pretends, development agreements benefiting the ACP countries. At the time when WTO 
undergoes a crisis of legitimacy, the EPAs are a replacement tool to force the countries to open and liberalize 
their agricultural market, despite the growing popular opposition against these policies. 
The organization considered the proposal that is currently under negotiation to be prejudicial to the 
peasants and small farmers in the Caribbean, Africa, and the Pacific for the following reasons:  
•  Reciprocity that the European Commission claims has no other meaning than the opening of the ACP 
markets for the European exportations.  
•  The peasants and small farmers in the Caribbean, the Pacific and in Africa will have to compete with 
food imports from the EU sold at artificially low prices.  
• More export market access will not benefit the small scale producers in neither of the four regions, 
because the great majority of peasants and small farmers sell their products on the local, national or 
regional markets, not on the international market.  
• The prices at which the producers of ACP countries will be able to export their products on the 
European market will decrease sharply, thus reducing the advantage that they had to export to the EU.  
• The elimination of the import tariffs will lead to a sharp decrease in the ACP states revenues, while 
many of these states are very dependant of these revenues for their budget. This lost will have a very 
critical impact on the capacity of the sates to invest in health, education, agriculture and public 
infrastructure for their development. 
Nothing compels neither the ACP countries nor the European Union to negotiate such agreements 
(They could get a new derogation to renew the Cotonou agreements). Inspite of this, the European Commission 
insists to terminate the negotiations before the 31st of December 2007. 
The organization thus calls for the mobilization of peasants, small farmers and civil society in our 
regions to stop definitively the Economic Partnership Agreements. 
The organization then calls on the governments of ACP countries to resist the pressures made by the 
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European Commission to terminate the negotiations. They called on the social movements and civil society 
organizations in Africa, Europe, the Pacific and the Caribbean to mobilize to prevent the signature of the 
Economic Partnership Agreements. 
 
Conclusion 
EU hides itself behind the so-called WTO constraints of Article XXIV to impose on ECOWAS as well as other 
developing countries in the name of EPAs.  Consequently, became inequitable bilateral FTA asking ACP 
countries to open up to 90% of their markets.  If this is permitted in Africa, EPAs will expose the manufacturing 
sector of the region to openly compete with EU transnational corporations (TNCs) in a corporate contest of 
unequal partners.  Competition can be viewed as a double-edged sword.   
On the one hand, it can spur the region’s domestic and regional manufacturing sector to improve their 
products and services while on the other hand, it can enable EU products to penetrate Nigerian and ECOWAS 
market to engage in predatory practices that can kill domestic producers.  With EPAs competition policy 
provisions, the domestic producers are rendered helpless from national industrial protection policies of import 
substitution.  In addition, EU is pushing the trade agenda into offensive areas which ACP countries had earlier 
opposed in the WTO Ministerial (i.e. the Singapore issues). The concept of reciprocity which EU is emphasing 
in the EPAs has been wrongly applied, as the WTO equally made provision for special and differential treatment 
for developing countries (Paolo, 2007: 2). 
The sub-regional and now bilateral negotiation approach in operation within the EPA negotiations also 
seems to offer the EC a very effective opportunity to divide and rule. ACP countries are having to negotiate in 
isolation or in small groups, and those countries and groups are increasingly finding themselves in competition 
with each other, which is having a negative impact on regional integration 
Overall, it seems that ACP countries, especially those who are LDCs (as most Africa countries are) 
have little to gain from EPAs and are participating simply to try and retain their existing trade preferences with 
the EU. But it seems they have a great deal to lose if they sign up to and implement EPAs. There is a significant 
chance that EPAs will increase poverty and hunger, rather the reduce them, and have negative impacts on 
environment. This is particularly the case in Africa, where most countries are LDCs and have little to lose if the 
EPAs process stops: they will still maintain most of their trade preferences under the EU’s ‘Everything But 
Arms’ agreement. 
The above view is in consonance with the one espoused by Mohammed Darami, ECOWAS 
Commissioner for Trade, Industry, Mines and Free Movement that, “confining West African countries to the 
production of primary commodities amounts to condemning them to remain locked in the commodity trap. We 
have asked EU to make a commitment to support us to industrialize, add some value to our products…We want 
them to support the EPA development programme. I cannot foresee us signing any EPA except those conditions 
are met. We cannot remain eternal primary producers”. 
In conclusion then, this paper seems to agree completely with the submission of the Friends of the 
Earth (an NGO based in London) in its last year publication titled: ‘EPAs, Forests and European Union’s Quest 
for Africa’s raw materials’. According to it, “it seems that there are many social, economic and environmental 
reasons not to proceed with EPAs; and little political reason to continue. The European Union must find 
alternative routes to assist ACP fair countries to develop sustainable societies. 
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